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HAS THE TIDE TURNED IN FAVOR OF 
DISCLOSURE? REVEALING MONEY IN POLITICS 
AFTER CITIZENS UNITED AND DOE V. REED 
Ciara Torres-Spelliscy* 
In 2008, a group few had heard of called Citizens United argued to 
the federal district court in D.C. that although their film, Hillary the 
Movie, was basically a feature length campaign ad about the then-
front-runner presidential candidate, Senator Hillary Clinton, 
nevertheless it should not be subject to the federal election law’s 
disclosure requirements. Their basic argument was that a 2007 
Supreme Court case about campaign funding source restrictions 
called Wisconsin Right to Life II (WRTL II) applied to disclosure as 
well, and WRTL II excused them, their film, and its ads from federal 
reporting requirements.1 The D.C. District Court did not buy what 
Citizens United was selling.2 This lower court found the funding of 
Hillary the Movie and its ads should be subject to the federal election 
laws and therefore should be fully transparent. 
Two years later, the case of Citizens United morphed from an 
arcane battle about whether on-demand political documentaries were 
broadcast campaign ads subject to disclosure for the purposes of 
federal election law into a paradigm-shifting Supreme Court case 
about the ability of all corporations to spend their treasury money on 
any election ad. The rest is history.3 The Supreme Court in Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission announced that corporate 
money (and union money for that matter) could be spent on any 
                                                                                                                 
 * During the drafting of this article, Ciara Torres-Spelliscy was Counsel at the Brennan Center for 
Justice at NYU School of Law. In the Fall of 2011 she will join the faculty of Stetson University College 
of Law to teach Constitutional Law and Election Law. The author would like to thank Professors 
Richard Hasen, Richard Briffault, and Michael Malbin for their review of an earlier draft of this piece. 
 1. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II), 551 U.S. 449 (2007). 
 2. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 280–81 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding 
WRTL II did not reach disclosure).  
 3. For a clever summary of Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, see Devereux Chatillon, 
Citizens United: Coming Soon to a Cable Broadcast and Satellite Channel Near You!, 27-APR. COMM. 
LAW. 1 (Apr. 2010). 
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independent expenditure (IEs) or electioneering communication 
(ECs) in any future election.4 
But the basic nub of how the Citizens United case started has 
largely been missed in the media’s coverage of the case’s more 
shocking holding allowing unlimited corporate spending.5 The 
Supreme Court agreed with the district court that Citizens United’s 
film and its ads for the film could both be constitutionally subject to 
federal campaign finance disclosure and disclaimer laws. This 
holding will have positive and lasting consequences for states that are 
eager to provide their electorates with robust campaign finance 
information. The Supreme Court, as well as lower courts, has 
generally been supportive of revealing the sources of money in 
politics with a few narrow exceptions, excusing (1) disclosure of de 
minimis political expenditures and (2) disclosures that could result in 
harassment. 
First, let me offer a few words about the scope of this article. There 
are two basic types of campaign finance disclosure: (1) entity-wide 
disclosure that is applied to candidate campaign committees, political 
action committees, and political parties and (2) event-triggered 
disclosure that is initiated by purchasing a political advertisement that 
applies to any purchaser. Entity-wide disclosure is much more 
comprehensive and usually requires the committee to account for 
every dollar that comes into the committee and every dollar that goes 
out of the committee. Or in other words, PACs and other registered 
political committees are subject to complete transparency. This 
article is primarily focused on the disclosure that is triggered by the 
purchase of a political advertisement in either a candidate’s election 
or in a ballot initiative election. At times to be complete, I will 
discuss how a particular case disposed of a challenge to entity-wide 
disclosure, but my primary focus here is disclosure that is triggered 
by the purchase of a political ad. In most cases, this requires the 
                                                                                                                 
 4. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913–17 (2010) (invalidating 
restrictions on independent expenditures and electioneering communications funded by corporate 
treasuries, while upholding federal disclosure and disclaimer laws). 
 5. Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Disclosures About Disclosure, 44 IND. L. REV. 255, 255 (2010) 
(questioning how much disclosure voters can digest). 
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entity that funded the ad to report to the state that the ad was 
purchased, as well as the underlying funders of the ad. In many 
states, disclaimers are required on the face of the ad identifying who 
is responsible for the advertisement. Most of the discussion in this 
article will focus on the disclosure triggered by the purchase of 
“electioneering communications,” which are also known as “sham 
issue ads.” Under federal law, “electioneering communications” are 
defined as “any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication 
that . . . refers to a clearly identified candidate . . . within 60 days 
before a general election . . . or within 30 days before a 
primary . . . [and that] can be received by 50,000 or more persons [in 
the candidate’s constituency]” costing at least $10,000.6 
This article will cover a short but tumultuous period in the history 
of campaign finance disclosure law from 2007 to 2010. This article 
will proceed primarily in a chronological fashion to highlight the 
dramatic 180 degree turn that the law has taken on the issue of the 
constitutionality of disclosure within the past four years. First, I will 
explore the hostility that many lower courts were exhibiting in the 
short window between Wisconsin Right to Life II (WRTL II) in 2007 
and Citizens United in 2010. Basically these lower courts made the 
mistake of applying WRTL II to disclosure laws. This mistake was 
corrected by the Supreme Court in Citizens United and Doe v. Reed 
in 2010. After Citizens United and Doe, lower courts all over the 
country have adopted the Supreme Court’s view that disclosure and 
disclaimers can be constitutionally applied to advertisements that 
feature candidates for office directly before an election. And lower 
courts have gone further to endorse disclosure around ballot measure 
fights as well. This article will also explore the two exemptions to 
disclosure laws that remain alive and well even after Citizens United 
and Doe: (1) de minimis spending and (2) fear of harassment. Finally, 
this article will conclude with a few policy suggestions for lawmakers 
crafting new disclosure laws. 
                                                                                                                 
 6. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)-(C). 
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I.  DARK DAYS FOR DISCLOSURE 2007–2010 
In 2008, the Citizens United plaintiffs were probably confident that 
they would win their challenge to disclosure as applied to their 
documentary because lower courts were growing more hostile to 
even modest campaign finance disclosure laws.7 As courts struggled 
with the balance between the First Amendment rights of political 
speakers—including a right to anonymous speech in certain limited 
circumstances—and the public’s right to know who is bankrolling 
political battles, during the first years of the new millennium, some 
lower courts struck down certain state campaign finance disclosure 
laws. Typically, the state laws that were found unconstitutional were 
ones that regulated more broadly than the federal election law. 
To understand the jurisprudential battle raging in the courts 
between 2007 and 2010 about the permissible scope of political ad 
disclosures, a bit of background of campaign finance law is 
necessary. In 1976, Buckley v. Valeo upheld the Federal Election 
Campaign Act’s (FECA’s) disclosure requirements for independent 
expenditures, but limited this disclosure to the magic words express 
advocacy.8 As a result, from 1976 to 2002, hundreds of millions of 
dollars of corporate and union treasury funds—money that could not 
legally be used to influence elections at the time—poured into federal 
campaign ads through the “sham issue ad” loophole9—the 
                                                                                                                 
 7. Many of these cases challenging disclosure were brought by the law firm Bopp, Coleson & 
Bostrom whose leading partner James Bopp has bragged to the New York Times shortly after Citizens 
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n was handed down that the next step in his ten-year plan is to roll back 
campaign finance disclosure rules. See David D. Kirkpatrick, A Quest to End Spending Rules for 
Campaigns, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2010, at A11. 
 8. The Buckley list of magic words includes: “vote for,” “elect,” “support,” “cast your ballot for,” 
“Smith for Congress,” “vote against,” “defeat,” and “reject.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44, n.52 
(1976). See also Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, The Impact of FEC v. Wisconsin 
Right to Life, Inc. on State Regulation of ‘Electioneering Communications’ in Candidate Elections, 
Including Campaigns for the Bench (Feb. 2008), http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-
/Democracy/Impact%20of%20WRTL%20II%20on%20State%20Regulation.pdf?nocdn=1. 
 9. CRAIG B. HOLMAN & LUKE P. MCLOUGHLIN, BUYING TIME 2000: TELEVISION ADVERTISING IN 
THE 2000 FEDERAL ELECTIONS, 10-11 (Brennan Center 2001), 
http://brennan.3cdn.net/efd37f417f16ee6341 _4dm6iid9c.pdf; JONATHAN S. KRASNO & DANIEL E. 
SELTZ, BUYING TIME: TELEVISION ADVERTISING IN THE 1998 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS (Brennan 
Center 2000); see also McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 197 (2003) (finding political advertising 
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disingenuous practice of running ads that featured a federal candidate 
right before a federal election in a candidate’s district without 
uttering Buckley’s magic words “vote for” or “vote against” in order 
to avoid campaign finance regulations.10 At the federal level, 
campaign finance reformers had long tried to close this sham issue ad 
loophole. It took decades and the collapse of the corporate giant 
Enron before Congress would heed the reformers’ call to action.11 
With the passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 
(BCRA or McCain-Feingold) this goal of closing the sham issue ad 
loophole was finally achieved. BCRA created a new category of 
regulated federal ads called “electioneering communications” (ECs) 
to capture the elusive sham issue ads that had evaded campaign 
finance regulations (including disclosure regulations) for decades. 
After Congress adopted BCRA and the Supreme Court gave its 
approval to the new law in McConnell v. Federal Election 
Commission in 2003, seventeen states copied the approach and 
adopted state-level electioneering communications laws.12 In some 
states, like North Carolina, these laws barred corporations, unions, or 
both from funding ECs in state elections.13 Other states, like Illinois, 
merely required disclosure of who was funding ECs without any 
concomitant source restrictions. 
                                                                                                                 
sponsors often hid behind misleading names, such as “Citizens for Better Medicare” [the pharmaceutical 
industry] or “Americans Working for Real Change” [business groups opposed to organized labor]). 
 10. BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, WRITING REFORM: A GUIDE TO DRAFTING STATE & LOCAL 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS 2010 EDITION I-12, I-14 (Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, ed., rev. ed. 2010), 
available at http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/writing_reform_2010. 
 11. Anthony Corrado, The Legislative Odyssey of BCRA, in LIFE AFTER REFORM 37 (Michael J. 
Malbin, ed., 2003), available at http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/books-reports/LAR/LAR_ch2.pdf (“[T]he 
bankruptcy of the Enron Corporation and other corporate scandals were matters of national attention, 
and raised alarming questions about the role political contributions played in policy decisions favorable 
to Enron and other corporations . . . .”). 
 12. See Alaska Stat. § 15.13.400 (5); Ariz. Stat. 16-901.01(A) & Ariz. Amend. Code R2-20-101 (10) 
Cal. Gov’t Code § 85310; Colo. Const. Art . 28 sec. 2 (7)(a); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 9-601b(a)(2); Fla. 
Stat. Ann. § 106.011(18)(a); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 11-207.6(c); Idaho Code Ann. § 67-6602(f); 10 Ill. 
Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/9-1.14(a); Ohio Stat. 3517.1011; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 21-A, § 1014(2-A); N.C. 
Session Law 2010-170; Okla. Stat. tit. 74, § 257:1-1-2; S.C. Code Ann. § 8-13-1300(31); Vt. Stat. Ann. 
tit. 17, § 2891; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 42.17.020; W. Va. Code Ann. § 3-8-1a(11)(A). 
 13. National Council on State Legislatures, Life After Citizens United, 
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=19607 (last visited Mar. 21, 2011) (listing states which 
previously banned corporate, union, or both forms of electioneering communications before Citizens 
United). These funding restrictions of political ads were declared unconstitutional in Citizens United. 
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Between 2007 and 2010, plaintiffs hostile to campaign finance 
reform challenged many of these new state electioneering 
communications laws (and in some cases, plaintiffs also challenged 
much older “express advocacy” disclosure laws on the books at the 
same time). Depending on how the state structured its laws, the legal 
challenges often centered around the definition of who or what 
qualified as a “political action committee” (PAC) because in many 
states campaign finance reporting is primarily triggered when an 
organization is deemed to be a PAC. In other cases, the challenge was 
to the state’s definition of ECs. But the general thrust of the 
challenges was similar—an attack on fundamental campaign finance 
laws, including basic disclosure laws. And for several years, 
opponents of campaign finance laws generally—and disclosure laws 
in particular—picked up some wins in the courts in the 2007–2010 
period. The reason I explore these earlier cases in some depth, even 
though I believe that they are wrongly decided in light of the 
Supreme Court’s later rulings in 2010, is I fear that future courts may 
be tempted to copy their flawed reasoning when reviewing new 
disclosure laws. Thus, exploring their faults may make it less likely 
that their mistakes will be repeated. 
While the courts reviewing disclosure laws between 2007 and 
2010 were wrestling with the narrow jurisprudential question of 
whether WRTL II applied to campaign finance disclosure, at the same 
time these courts were grappling with a far deeper philosophical 
question of what an “election ad” is.14 In Buckley, the Supreme Court 
granted the newly formed FEC clear authority over election ads that 
contained “express advocacy” for or against a federal candidate but 
held that pure “issue ads” about public policy choices could not be 
regulated. As alluded to above, this allowed a slew of sham issue ads 
that featured a tiny reference to an issue and focused on a federal 
candidate to go unregulated—allowing such ads to be made without 
an ounce of disclosure to the public as to its source. 
                                                                                                                 
 14. This definitional problem is not purely American. Other modern democracies have also had to 
grapple with this problem. Andrew C. Geddis, Democratic Visions and Third-Party Independent 
Expenditures: A Comparative View, 9 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 5 (2001) (comparing election laws in the 
US, UK and Canada). 
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Buckley’s “express advocacy/issue ad” paradigm left Congress 
with a conundrum. If they adopted a reasonable person test to 
determine when an issue ad was really a sham issue ad, then they 
would place elections administrators in the untenable position of 
being arbiters of which ads could be regulated. This would require 
the FEC to look at ads one by one by one to make these 
determinations. This would be an unadministrable system. On the 
other hand, if Congress drew a bright-line test based on objective 
criteria such as the proximity to an election, the mentioning of a 
candidate, or the targeting of the candidate’s electorate, this would 
give speakers fair warning of when they would and would not be 
regulated, but the regulation could risk sweeping in ads that were not 
meant to influence the election, but either were grassroots lobbying 
of sitting incumbents, or were purely selling products. 
In McConnell, this conundrum was resolved. The Supreme Court 
deferred to Congress and allowed it the latitude to institute a bright-
line definition of ECs. McConnell allowed ECs to be regulated both 
in terms of source restrictions and disclosure requirements. It stated 
that the “express advocacy/issue ad” paradigm was a matter of 
statutory construction and not a constitutional requirement. WRTL II 
abandoned this bright-line test when it came to corporate source 
restrictions for the funding of ECs. In place of BRCA’s bright-line 
definition, WRTL II said ECs had to contain the functional equivalent 
of express advocacy before then-applicable corporate money 
restriction could attach. But WRTL II did not deal with BCRA’s 
separate disclosure provisions. 
In Citizens United, two open questions left by WRTL II were 
clarified. First, the Supreme Court said that all corporations could 
spend their treasury funds on both express advocacy and 
electioneering communications. Second, the court dropped WRTL II’s 
functional equivalency test for electioneering communications and 
reverted to Congress’ original bright-line approach.  Thus, the nature 
of what is a regulable political ad at the federal level reverted to all 
express advocacy ads plus any ad falling within the electioneering 
communication definition. As federal law stands now, any ad falling 
outside these two categories is beyond the reach of the FEC’s 
7
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regulation. Should Congress broaden the definition of electioneering 
communications, then more political ads may be subject to regulation 
in the future.15 
A.  Is Federal Campaign Finance Disclosure Law a Floor or a 
Ceiling? 
Meanwhile, in the 50 states, regulation of political ads is more 
multifaceted because in addition to legislative and executive 
elections, 39 states must contend with judicial elections and half of 
states allow for ballot initiatives,16 neither of which has a federal 
analog. This has left state and federal courts reviewing their laws to 
debate the conceptual problem: Is federal law a floor or a ceiling 
when states adopt disclosure laws that captured political ads that lack 
Buckley’s magic words? This is a particularly tricky question when 
that calculus is applied to any type of state election that does not exist 
at the federal level. Hence, the on-going debate about exactly what 
types of election ads states may regulate rages on. 
The most successful line of attack on campaign finance disclosure 
laws, especially after the Supreme Court decided Wisconsin Right to 
Life II (WRTL II) in 2007, was that a given state electioneering 
communication law or regulation was broader than the federal 
definition of ECs under BCRA. One version of this line of attack by 
plaintiffs was that states could only constitutionally require disclosure 
of ads that contained “the functional equivalence of express 
advocacy,” instead of all ads that would be captured by a state’s 
                                                                                                                 
 15. For example the DISCLOSE Act from the 111th Congress would have expanded the definition 
of ads that could be regulated. COMM. ON HOUSE ADMIN., DEMOCRACY IS STRENGTHENED BY CASTING 
LIGHT ON SPENDING IN ELECTIONS ACT’ OR THE ‘‘DISCLOSE ACT,’’ H.R. 5157, H.R. REP. NO. 111-
492 (May 25, 2010), http://www.rules.house.gov/111/CommJurRpt/111_hr5175_rpt.pdf. This bill failed 
to overcome a filibuster in the Senate in 2010. 
 16. For an in depth discussion of the special issues raised by ballot measures, see Michael S. Kang, 
Democratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring Voter Competence Through Heuristic Cues and 
“Disclosure Plus,” 50 UCLA L. Rev. 1141, 1141 (2003) (“I argue that strengthening heuristic cues in 
direct democracy offers the best means of rehabilitating voter competence pragmatically, at low cost, 
without trying to force voters to adjust the way they think about politics . . . . Under the ‘disclosure plus’ 
framework presented here, the government should attempt not only to produce heuristic cues in direct 
democracy through increased campaign finance disclosure, but also to increase public awareness of 
those heuristic cues by broadcasting them to the public in highly visible ways.”). 
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given electioneering communication definition.17 This amorphous 
phrase “the functional equivalence of express advocacy”18 comes 
from Chief Justice Robert’s plurality opinion in WRTL II. According 
to the Court, an ad is “the functional equivalent of express advocacy” 
only if it is “susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as 
an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate.”19 Evidence that 
an ad had functional equivalence included: “tak[ing] a position on a 
candidate’s character, qualifications, or fitness for office.”20 
“Functional equivalence of express advocacy”21 was deemed by 
WRTL II to be a constitutional prerequisite before the then-applicable 
federal ban on corporate electioneering would attach to a given ad. 
Plaintiffs challenging campaign finance disclosure laws argued to 
courts across the country that WRTL II, even though the case 
explicitly did not cover federal disclosure laws, could nonetheless be 
applied to state disclosure laws. Some lower courts fell for this 
argument hook, line, and sinker, striking disclosure laws from Florida 
to Utah.22 
B.  WRTL II Was Not About Disclosure 
The basic mistake that several lower courts made in the 2007–2010 
time frame was reading WRTL II as a new limitation on disclosure 
when BCRA’s disclosure requirements for ECs were not before the 
Court in WRTL II. The Supreme Court had no occasion to address 
federal disclosure rules in this case, since this part of BCRA was not 
challenged by plaintiffs. WRTL II was merely an as-applied challenge 
to the federal law prohibition in § 441b of Title 2 of the U.S. Code on 
the use of treasury funds by corporations and unions to pay for ECs. 
                                                                                                                 
 17. WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 465. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 469–70. 
 20. Id. at 470. 
 21. Id. at 465. 
 22. See N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake (NCRL III), 525 F.3d 274, 304 (4th Cir. 2008) (requiring a 
state law to conform with the federal definition of electioneering communications); W. Tradition P’ship 
v. City of Longmont, No. 09-CV-02303-WDM-MTW, 2009 WL 3418220, at *7 (D. Colo. Oct. 21, 
2009) (preliminarily enjoining a municipal electioneering communications law such that only express 
advocacy could be regulated). 
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As a plaintiff, Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. explicitly did not seek 
review of the electioneering communications’ disclosure provisions 
of the law. In the original complaint filed by Wisconsin Right to Life, 
Inc., they made clear that “WRTL does not challenge the reporting 
and disclaimer requirements for ECs, only the prohibition on using its 
corporate funds for its grass-roots lobbying advertisements.”23 
Consequently, nothing in WRTL II undermines McConnell’s 
unequivocal holding that reporting requirements for ECs are fully 
constitutional. But as detailed below, for a few years lower courts 
made the mistake of reading WRTL II as dictating a limit on 
campaign finance disclosure laws. 
C.  BCRA as a Ceiling for State Laws: Misapplying WRTL II 
The Fourth Circuit was the first federal court of appeals to grapple 
with the disclosure issue after WRTL II in a case called N.C. Right to 
Life, Inc. v. Leake (NCRL III).24 This case challenged several 
interlocking definitions within North Carolina’s election code, 
including the definition of “to support or oppose the nomination or 
election of one or more clearly identified candidates.”25 The NCRL 
III case also challenged the constitutionality of the state’s deeming 
N.C. Right to Life and some of its affiliated entities “political 
committees.”26 The Fourth Circuit adopted the plaintiffs’ arguments 
that BCRA was a ceiling that states could not exceed when regulating 
“sham issue ads.”27 
The Fourth Circuit chose to read WRTL II as severely limiting 
which ECs may be regulated at the state level. The court put North 
Carolina’s EC regulations to a WRTL II functional equivalence test. 
The Fourth Circuit articulated a two-part test to determine whether a 
communication is the “functional equivalent of express advocacy” 
that fundamentally treats BCRA definition of ECs as a ceiling, rather 
                                                                                                                 
 23. Complaint at ¶ 36, Wis. Right to Life v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 2004 WL 3622736 (D.D.C. 
Aug. 17, 2004) (No. 04-1260), 2004 WL 2057568. 
 24. N.C. Right to Life v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 25. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.14A(a) (2010). 
 26. NCRL III, 525 F.3d at 277. 
 27. Id. at 322 (quoting McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 185 (2003)). 
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than merely a floor, on disclosure.28 Whether a communication 
matched BCRA’s definition of ECs is step one of the test set out by 
the court. As the Fourth Circuit stated, “[T]o be considered the 
‘functional equivalent of express advocacy’ . . . the communication 
must qualify as an ‘electioneering communication,’ defined 
by . . . [BCRA], as a ‘broadcast, cable, or satellite communication’ 
that refers to a ‘clearly identified candidate’ within sixty days of a 
general election or thirty days of a primary election.”29 The second 
part of the Fourth Circuit’s test is whether the communication is an 
appeal to support or oppose a specific candidate. As the Court 
articulated: 
Second, a communication can be deemed the “functional 
equivalent of express advocacy only if [it] is susceptible of no 
reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or 
against a specific candidate.” . . . Taken together, these two 
requirements should be sufficiently “protective of political 
speech” to allow legislatures to regulate beyond Buckley’s 
“magic words” approach.30 
The North Carolina law at issue in NCRL III included a section 
entitled “evidence that communications are ‘to support or oppose the 
nomination or election of one or more clearly identified 
candidates.’”31 This definition was cross-referenced in other portions 
of the North Carolina law including the disclosure requirements, 
contribution limits, and limits on corporations’ and unions’ treasury 
spending. By invalidating this section, the court invalidated all of the 
sections of the law that cross-referenced it as well. This definition 
contained two prongs. The first prong was a “magic words” test that 
followed Buckley in lockstep. The second “context” prong directed 
                                                                                                                 
 28. Under federal law, electioneering communications are broadcast ads aired 30 days before a 
primary or 60 days before a general election that mention a federal candidate, cost at least $10,000, and 
are targeted to the relevant electorate. Id. at 282. 
 29. Id. (citation omitted). 
 30. Id. (alteration in original). 
 31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.14A(a) (2008). 
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that if the “essential nature” of a communication was “unclear,” then 
regulators “may” consider 
contextual factors such as the language of the communication as 
a whole, the timing of the communication in relation to events of 
the day, the distribution of the communication to a significant 
number of registered voters for that candidate’s election, and the 
cost of the communication . . . in determining whether the action 
urged could only be interpreted by a reasonable person as 
advocating the nomination, election, or defeat of that candidate 
in that election.32 
The Fourth Circuit explained that, in its view, the second part of 
North Carolina’s definition overreached in light of WRTL II’s 
holding. As the court wrote, “[I]t is clear that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-
278.14A(a)(2) is unconstitutional. [It] regulates speech that is neither 
‘express advocacy’ nor its ‘functional equivalent’ and, therefore, 
strays too far from the regulation of elections into the regulation of 
ordinary political speech.”33 Of particular concern to the Fourth 
Circuit was the fact that the definition of evidence that 
communications are “to support or oppose the nomination or election 
of one or more clearly identified candidates” did not “explicitly 
limit[] its scope to either specific people or a specific time period.”34 
An additional flaw, according to the court, was that the North 
Carolina definition turned in part on a reasonable person test that 
could entrap an unwary speaker. As the Fourth Circuit’s majority 
objected: 
[This law] runs directly counter to the teaching of WRTL when it 
determines whether speech is regulable based on how a 
“reasonable person” interprets a communication in light of four 
“contextual factors.” This sort of ad hoc, totality of the 
                                                                                                                 
 32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.14A(a)(2) (1999), amended by 2008 N.C. Sess. Laws 150, § 6(b). 
 33. NCRL III, 525 F.3d at 283. 
 34. Id. at 280, 283 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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circumstances-based approach provides neither fair warning to 
speakers that their speech will be regulated nor sufficient 
direction to regulators as to what constitutes political speech.35 
The Court struck down the reasonable person “context” prong of 
North Carolina’s law, taking down at the same time the disclosure 
that would have been triggered by most sham issue ads in North 
Carolina. 
Under the Fourth Circuit’s reading of the law after WRTL II, 
disclosure by political committees is both “costly” and 
“burdensome.”36 Consequently, the majority criticized disclosure 
requirements, like PAC reporting requirements, throughout its 
opinion. For example, the Fourth Circuit complained, “Political 
committees must . . . appoint a treasurer . . . , abide by contribution 
limits, and comply with time-consuming disclosure requirements that 
allow the state to scrutinize their affairs. These requirements are more 
than just nuisances, and indeed are precisely the sort of burden that 
discourages potential speakers from engaging in political debate.”37 
NCRL III invalidated disclosure requirements that went beyond the 
definitions contained in federal law. The Fourth Circuit was hostile to 
campaign finance disclosure in general and as applied to the N.C. 
Right to Life specifically. The Court definitively decided in NCRL III 
that BCRA was a ceiling that states could not go beyond. As will be 
explored in more depth below, Citizens United indicates that 
NCRL III was likely wrongly decided because it incorrectly applied 
WRTL II restrictions to disclosure. 
D.  A Forceful Dissent in the Fourth Circuit’s NCRL III 
Signs that NCRL III was wrongly decided were evident on its face 
because it was not a unanimous decision. The dissent in NCRL III 
penned by Judge Michael vociferously claimed that the Fourth 
Circuit’s majority had decided the case incorrectly by misreading 
                                                                                                                 
 35. Id. 
 36. WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 468–69. 
 37. NCRL III, 525 F.3d at 304 (citations omitted). 
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Supreme Court precedents. As the dissent by Judge Michael stated, 
“[T]he majority . . . severely restricts the well-established power of a 
state to regulate its elections. One result will be that organizations 
and individuals will be able to easily disguise their campaign 
advocacy as issue advocacy, thereby avoiding 
regulation . . . [thereby] ‘hid[ing] themselves from the scrutiny of the 
voting public.’”38 
Judge Michael found that the majority in NCRL III fundamentally 
misread McConnell’s rejection of Buckley’s “magic words” approach. 
In McConnell, the court said that express advocacy was not a 
required predicate for regulation.39 The dissent rejected the 
majority’s two-part test that the only way a state can regulate EC is 
if: (1) the state’s definition of ECs exactly mirror BCRA’s definition 
and (2) the communication is “susceptible of no reasonable 
interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific 
candidate.”40 Judge Michael explained, “The majority clearly errs by 
mandating the elements of BCRA § 203, which is simply an example 
of a clear and sufficiently tailored statute, as an essential part of any 
campaign regulation.”41 In other words, BCRA was just one example 
of a constitutional regulation of political ads; state laws did not have 
to be identical to BCRA in order to be found constitutional. 
Critically, the NCRL III dissent suggested that the majority 
misstepped by applying WRTL II’s analysis of corporate expenditure 
restrictions to North Carolina’s disclosure requirements. Judge 
Michael continued: “[T]he majority’s rule applies the WRTL II 
analysis to disclosure requirements, contribution limits, and political 
committee designations. No other court has applied WRTL II to all 
types of campaign finance regulations; instead, every court to address 
                                                                                                                 
 38. Id. at 308 (Michael, J., dissenting); see also id. at 310 (noting there are many state interests 
served by disclosure besides the anti-corruption interest, including the voter’s interest in knowing where 
political campaign money comes from and how it is spent, the regulator’s interest in finding violations 
of the law, and the interest in providing timely information to voters). 
 39. Id. at 314. 
 40. Id. at 315. 
 41. NCRL III, 525 F.3d at 316 (Michael, J., dissenting). 
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the issue has rejected any application beyond direct limits on 
corporate expenditures.”42 
Judge Michael concluded that the majority in NCRL III had 
fundamentally misread the precedent: 
Thus, the majority errs by ignoring McConnell’s rejection of any 
rigid constitutional rule that divides constitutionally protected 
speech from speech that can be regulated in the area of campaign 
finance regulation; errs by requiring the exact terms of BCRA 
referred to in passing by WRTL II; errs by ignoring the difference 
in treatment between facial and as-applied challenges that the 
Supreme Court requires; and errs by applying the same rule to 
every type of regulation, rather than conducting an overbreadth 
analysis based on the purpose and effect of the regulation.43 
As will be discussed in more depth below, the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in Citizens United is more in line with Judge Michael’s 
approach. Also, after Citizens United, the Ninth Circuit did not 
follow the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning but rather adopted the approach 
of Judge Michael’s trenchant dissent in NCRL III.44 
E.  Certain District Courts Followed in the Fourth Circuit’s Faulty 
Footsteps 
Unfortunately, some lower courts found the Fourth Circuit’s 
analysis in NCRL III persuasive. Three district courts applied the 
Fourth Circuit’s questionable “BCRA as a ceiling” approach to state 
campaign finance laws in order to invalidate them. For example, a 
federal district court in Broward Coalition of Condominiums v. 
Browning held that Florida’s electioneering definition, which 
included non-broadcast political ads, was unconstitutional.45 Under 
                                                                                                                 
 42. Id. at 317. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Human Life of Wash., Inc. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 45. Broward Coal. of Condos., Homeowners Ass’ns & Cmty. Orgs., Inc. v. Browning, No. 
4:08cv445-SPM/WCS, 2008 WL 4791004, at *10 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 29, 2008) (preliminarily enjoining the 
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the Florida law, an “electioneering communication” included “a paid 
expression in any communications media,”46 and “communications 
media” meant “broadcasting stations, newspapers, magazines, 
outdoor advertising facilities, printers, direct mail, advertising 
agencies, the Internet, and telephone companies.”47 
Plaintiffs in Browning wished to run print ads about ballot 
measures, but did not want to be subject to the law’s disclosure 
requirements. The district court concluded that only broadcast ECs 
can be regulated. The Florida court followed the Fourth Circuit’s 
two-part test. As the court wrote, “This two-pronged analysis is 
consistent with the First Amendment’s command that ‘when it comes 
to defining what speech qualifies as the functional equivalent of 
express advocacy subject to . . . a ban . . . we give the benefit of the 
doubt to speech, not censorship.’”48 The Florida court was quite 
critical of the statute’s breadth. “The Florida statute is a sweeping 
regulation of speech—i.e., virtually all paid communications about 
ballot issues and candidates.”49 This court noted that other lower 
courts had rejected regulation of speech that was broader than 
BCRA.50 
The district court relied heavily on WRTL II in drawing its legal 
conclusion that the Florida electioneering communications statute 
was overbroad. 
[I]t is impossible to read Buckley or McConnell as sanctioning 
the regulation of all the speech encompassed within Florida’s 
expansive and much broader definition of “electioneering 
communication.” 
Defendants also cite McConnell for the proposition that there is 
not a constitutionally compelled line between express advocacy 
                                                                                                                 
law), and 2009 WL 1457972 (N.D. Fla. May 22, 2009) (permanently enjoining the electioneering 
portions of the Florida law). 
 46. FLA. STAT. § 106.011(18)(a) (2008) (amended 2010). 
 47. FLA. STAT. § 106.011(13) (2010). 
 48. Browning, 2008 WL 4791004, at *7 (omission in original) (quoting WRTL II, 551 U.S. 449, 482 
(2007) (preliminarily enjoining the law)). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
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and issue advocacy. But this claim completely ignores WRTL II. 
WRTL II held that there is a line between speech that is the 
functional equivalent of express advocacy and the vast majority 
of political speech falling outside that category and that line is 
constitutionally compelled.51 
Because Florida’s law was broader than BCRA, it was deemed 
unconstitutional and was preliminarily enjoined. A few months later, 
the law was permanently enjoined.52 In the later decision, the court 
stated that Florida’s disclosure requirements were content-based 
restrictions of speech and constituted a prior restraint on speakers and 
were therefore presumptively invalid. As the district court concluded, 
because “[t]he reporting and disclosure requirements . . . appl[y] to 
certain communication and not other[s], [they are] content-based. 
Additionally, because this regulation allows for the communication to 
be burdened by the disclosure and reporting requirements in advance 
of the act of communicating their message, it constitutes a prior 
restraint.”53 
The Court went on to explain the three reasons why the plaintiffs 
could not be constitutionally compelled to disclose their print 
advertisements about ballot measures by the Florida law: 
First, none of the Plaintiffs are issuing a communication via 
broadcast, cable, or satellite, as was the case in BCRA’s 
definition (which establishes the outer bounds of permissible 
regulation). Second, all of the speech at issue here is susceptible 
of a reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for 
or against that candidate. Third, Plaintiffs’ speech relating to 
ballot issues cannot, by definition, be express advocacy because 
it has nothing to do with advocating for a particular candidate.54 
                                                                                                                 
 51. Id. at *8 (citation omitted). 
 52. Broward Coal. of Condos., Homeowners Ass’ns & Cmty. Orgs. Inc. v. Browning, No. 
4:08cv445-SPM/WCS, 2009 WL 1457972, at *8 (N.D. Fla. May 22, 2009). 
 53. Id. at *4 (citation omitted). 
 54. Id. at *6. 
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This reasoning about ballot measures appears flawed under a separate 
line of Supreme Court precedent.55 But the basic conclusion was 
amazingly broad, potentially preventing the state of Florida from 
revealing any information about who was behind ballot measure 
fights if the campaign was conducted by print instead of broadcast. 
Like NCRL III, Browning appears to be wrongly decided in light of 
Citizens United and Doe. 
At roughly the same time that the Florida case was being litigated, 
in Utah plaintiffs challenged that state’s definition of “political issues 
expenditure” and related disclosure requirements.56 The district court 
in Utah again found that even when only disclosure is at issue, the 
state may only regulate express advocacy: “[T]he [Supreme] Court’s 
analysis of the vagueness issue, with regard to both this [Utah] 
provision and FECA’s disclosure requirement provision, has long 
stood for the proposition that legislatures may only regulate those 
campaign communications that use the ‘magic words of express 
advocacy.’”57 For this court, perplexingly, despite the 2003 
McConnell case, 1976’s Buckley provided the relevant precedent. 
“Although McConnell did expand the definition of express advocacy 
to encompass more than just ‘magic words,’ it did not overturn 
Buckley’s unambiguously campaign related standard.”58 Like the 
Florida district court, the Utah district court followed the Fourth 
Circuit’s flawed two-part test.59 
In Utah, the court was particularly critical that one of the ads 
captured by the regulation ran seven months before an election 
instead of within sixty days of an election as required by BCRA. As 
the court complained: 
                                                                                                                 
 55. See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792 n.32 (1978) (“Identification of the 
source of advertising may be required as a means of disclosure, so that the people will be able to 
evaluate the arguments to which they are being subjected.”); Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of 
Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 299-300 (1981) (“The integrity of the political system will be adequately 
protected if contributors [to ballot issue committees] are identified in a public filing revealing the 
amounts contributed . . . .”). 
 56. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 20A-11-101(7) and 20A-11-101(32) (2011). 
 57. Nat’l Right to Work Legal Def. & Educ. Found., Inc. v. Herbert, 581 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1141 n.7 
(D. Utah 2008). 
 58. Id. at 1148 n.9. 
 59. Id. at 1144. 
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The Foundation ran its advertisements in April 2007, seven 
months prior to the general election—the only election in which 
the initiative was on the ballot—and long before the time frame 
that would fit it within the definition of an “electioneering 
communication” under BCRA. Having failed the first 
requirement of the functional equivalent test, the Foundation’s 
advertisements are not unambiguously campaign related and thus 
cannot be constitutionally regulated.60 
Again this court treated BCRA as a ceiling for state regulations—
even as applied to ballot measures which have no federal analog. The 
district court narrowed what could be regulated by the Utah statute to 
only those communications that could be regulated under BCRA, but 
nonetheless found that even this narrowed definition could not be 
constitutionally applied to plaintiffs.61 Again, this case appears to be 
wrongly decided in light of Citizens United and Doe. 
In yet a third state, a federal district court in West Virginia 
enjoined the state’s definition of ECs to the extent that it covered 
non-broadcast ads.62 After this April 2008 ruling, the legislature 
amended the law slightly and added legislative findings supporting 
the regulation of non-broadcast ads.63 A second judge reviewing the 
amended West Virginia law found that it still was too broad because 
it went beyond the four corners of BCRA.64 According to the second 
judge, BCRA’s definition of ECs contains the outer limit of what can 
be regulated.65 He stated: 
In McConnell, the Supreme Court reached the maximum extent 
of the curtailment of free speech for the laudable purpose of 
political integrity when it upheld BCRA. Notably, in McConnell, 
the Court found the regulation of broadcast media, but not other 
                                                                                                                 
 60. Id. at 1150. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Ctr. for Individual Freedom, Inc. v. Ireland, No. 1:08-00190, 2008 WL 1837324, at *5 (S.D.W. 
Va. Apr. 22, 2008). 
 63. Ctr. for Individual Freedom, Inc. v. Ireland, 613 F. Supp. 2d 777, 781 n.5 (S.D.W. Va. 2009). 
 64. Id. at 800. 
 65. Id. 
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forms of communication, to be constitutional when it upheld 
BCRA.66 
The West Virginia Court was not satisfied with the evidence 
produced by the state that print ECs should be regulated. 
It appears that Defendant Betty Ireland has certainly filed a 
sufficient amount of information for the inclusion of broadcast 
media in West Virginia’s definition of “electioneering 
communication,” which is clearly constitutional. However, much 
less has been offered in support [of] the inclusion of print media. 
In general what was been offered is conclusory, as in the case of 
the legislative findings; anecdotal instead of empirical, such as 
the testimonials of several legislators; or not specifically 
applicable to West Virginia. 
In the absence of more concrete data supporting the inclusion of 
print media, the Court must “err on the side of protecting 
political speech,” and find that Defendants have not met their 
burden of showing that West Virginia’s definition of 
“electioneering communication” is narrowly tailored.67 
Consequently, for the second time, the court granted the plaintiff’s 
request for a preliminary injunction of West Virginia’s definition of 
ECs.68 
To be fair, not every lower court fell for the “BCRA as a ceiling” 
meme. Two district court cases, in Washington and Ohio, concluded 
rightly that disclosure of state ECs is distinct from corporate funding 
bans.69 The D.C. federal district court also upheld federal disclosure 
in Citizens United’s original case against a claim that WRTL II 
somehow excused it from disclosure requirements.70 Decisions in 
                                                                                                                 
 66. Id. (citation omitted). 
 67. Id. at 801 (citation omitted). 
 68. Id. at 810.  
 69. Human Life of Wash., Inc. v. Brumsickle, No. C08-0590-JCC, 2009 WL 62144, at *17 (W.D. 
Wash. Jan. 8, 2009), aff’d, 624 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010); Ohio Right to Life Soc’y, Inc. v. Ohio 
Elections Comm’n, No. 2:08-cb-00492, 2008 WL 4186312, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 5, 2008).  
 70. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 280–81 (D.D.C. 2008). 
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other lower courts have noted that WRTL II did not reach the issue of 
disclosure.71 In sum, these federal courts found that disclosure was 
amply justified by the strong public interest in an informed electorate, 
and the Supreme Court’s holding in WRTL II in no way altered or 
touched upon this interest. 
In 2008, bucking the anti-disclosure trend, a federal district court 
in Washington State upheld Washington’s disclosure of “political 
advertisements,” which included ads about ballot initiatives, noting 
that the McConnell Court had clearly distinguished between 
disclosure, upholding it “without reservation,” and the restrictions on 
corporate funding for ECs: “McConnell limited the definition of 
‘electioneering communication’ to the ‘functional equivalent of 
express advocacy’ only as far as it applied to the prohibition on 
corporate and union speech, and apparently not as it applied to the 
BCRA’s disclosure requirements.”72 As will be discussed further 
below, the Ninth Circuit affirmed this lower court’s ruling in 
Brumsickle post-Citizens United, thereby upholding robust disclosure 
of who is funding a ballot measure.73 
A key issue in the district court’s consideration of Brumsickle was 
whether Washington State’s disclosure law swept too broadly, post-
WRTL II by including issue advocacy about ballot measures. The 
district court concluded that Washington State’s disclosure of 
spending on ads about ballot issues was constitutional because of the 
public’s interest in casting an informed vote: 
Accordingly, the Court rejects [plaintiffs’] contention that there 
is a bright-line rule prohibiting the regulation of “issue 
advocacy” and holds that the state’s compelling interests in 
informing the electorate and protecting contributors justify 
requiring “political committees” to report on and disclose all 
expenditures made “in support of, or opposition to . . . a ballot 
                                                                                                                 
 71. See, e.g., Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Randolph, 507 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 2007) (WRTL II 
did not reach disclosure); Koerber v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 583 F. Supp. 2d 740, 746 (E.D.N.C. 2008) 
(“The WRTL II decision makes no mention of the disclosure requirements upheld in McConnell . . . .”). 
 72. Brumsickle, 2009 WL 62144, at *17 (citation omitted) (emphasis omitted). 
 73. Human Life of Wash., Inc. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990, 1023 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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proposition.” This holds even when “expenditure” is defined to 
include some advocacy as to the “issue” underlying the 
proposition, as long as such regulations are limited to the specific 
issue on which the public’s vote is being sought.74 
Thus, in contrast to the approach by the district court in Florida, 
which found there could be no such thing as express advocacy with 
regard to ballot measures which were purely issue advocacy, the 
district court in Washington found that support of ballot measures 
could be regulated even if the regulation captured some issue 
advocacy. 
In an unreported case, an Ohio-based federal district court also 
correctly interpreted the scope of McConnell and WRTL II in 
upholding an Ohio disclosure provision against a facial challenge.75 
Plaintiff Ohio Right to Life Society challenged the state’s restrictions 
on corporate funding of ECs.76 Ohio’s definitions and treatment of 
electioneering communications were nearly identical to federal rules 
for ECs. Plaintiffs specifically challenged the validity of Ohio’s pre-
election rules, which create a period in which corporations and 
unions are unable to pay for ECs with corporate treasury funds.77 
A key issue considered by the court in Ohio Right to Life Society 
was how WRTL II altered McConnell’s holdings, if at all. The Ohio 
court held that with regards to the corporate treasury restrictions on 
pre-election spending, McConnell was still the controlling 
precedent.78 This case’s holding on corporate funding restrictions has 
since been overruled by Citizens United, which found such funding 
source restrictions unconstitutional as applied to ECs. The federal 
district court in Ohio held that “[p]laintiff’s facial challenge fails 
because WRTL expressly did not alter McConnell . . . , which held 
that the blackout provision in [BCRA] is facially valid.”79 However, 
                                                                                                                 
 74. Brumsickle, 2009 WL 62144, at *18 (alteration in original). 
 75. Ohio Right to Life Soc’y, Inc. v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, No. 2:08-cv-00492, 2008 WL 
4186312, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 5, 2008). 
 76. Id. at *2. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at *11. 
 79. Id. at *6. 
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the Ohio court found that the Ohio provision was unconstitutional as 
applied to the plaintiff’s ads because the ads were nearly identical to 
the ads in WRTL II, and did not contain express advocacy or the 
functional equivalent of express advocacy. Furthermore, the Ohio 
court found that the defendants did not identify a sufficiently 
compelling interest to regulate the plaintiff’s particular ads.80 
II.  A NEW DAY DAWNS IN 2010 WITH  
CITIZENS UNITED AND DOE V. REED 
In the end, it would take another decision from the Supreme Court 
to finally put an end to this misreading of WRTL II. In Citizens 
United, the Supreme Court finally clarified that disclosure was not 
subject to WRTL II’s so-called “functional equivalence” test.81 The 
Supreme Court was very sympathetic to disclosure and disclaimers in 
Citizens United, saying, “[W]e reject [the] contention that the 
disclosure requirements must be limited to speech that is the 
functional equivalent of express advocacy.”82 Instead, Citizens United 
gave a full-throated endorsement of disclosure based on both the 
voters’ informational interest as well as, in the case of corporations, 
the shareholders’ interest83 in holding corporations accountable for 
their political spending.84 The Supreme Court also upheld disclosure 
information about ballot measure petition signatories in Doe v. Reed 
in 2010.85 
                                                                                                                 
 80. Id. at *7. 
 81. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 82. Id. at 915. 
 83. For a discussion of the shareholder rights implicated by Citizens United, see Lucian Bebchuk & 
Robert Jackson, Corporate Political Speech Who Decides? 124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 84 (Nov. 2010) 
(arguing for rules that “mandate detailed and robust disclosure to shareholders of the amounts and 
beneficiaries of a corporation's political spending, whether made directly by the company or indirectly 
through intermediaries”); Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Campaign Spending, Giving Shareholders 
a Voice (Brennan Center 2010) (arguing for shareholder disclosure and consent). 
 84. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 915–17 (upholding disclaimer and disclosure requirements for 
independent expenditures and electioneering communications). Citizens United went on to avoid federal 
disclosure requirements by claiming that it is a press entity. In an advisory opinion, the FEC agreed, 
granting Citizens United a media exemption from disclosure. See Op. Fed. Elect. Comm., 2010-08 (Jun. 
11, 2010). 
 85. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2821 (2010) (upholding disclosure of referendum petitions). 
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The key state interest that campaign finance disclosure laws serve 
is informing the average voter who paid for a given political ad so 
that the voter can take that information into account while assessing 
the ad and its argument about the upcoming election.86 As the 
Supreme Court noted in Citizens United, campaign finance disclosure 
enables an informed electorate to weigh the political ads they view in 
an election cycle: “The First Amendment protects political speech; 
and disclosure permits citizens . . . to react to the speech of corporate 
entities in a proper way. This transparency enables the electorate to 
make informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers 
and messages.”87 The Court also indicated that federal campaign 
finance disclosures about ECs “help citizens ‘make informed choices 
in the political marketplace.’”88 
In particular, disclosure of who is funding political speech may 
reveal the affiliations of the politicians who benefit,89 or as the 
Supreme Court wrote in Citizens United, “[C]itizens can see whether 
elected officials are ‘‘in the pocket’ of so-called moneyed 
interests.’”90 The Supreme Court also acknowledged that twenty-first 
century technology makes campaign finance information 
instantaneously available for average citizens and is therefore all the 
more empowering.91 
The Supreme Court signaled in Citizens United that it would not 
distinguish campaign finance laws based on the media used to 
transmit a political message—in this case, video-on-demand over a 
cable system. As Justice Kennedy wrote, “Courts, too, are bound by 
                                                                                                                 
 86. Over the past decades, the Supreme Court has recognized a number of state interests in 
disclosure around candidate elections including Buckley’s voter information interest, anti-corruption 
interest, and anti-circumvention interest, Caperton v. Massey’s due process interest in judicial elections, 
as well as Doe v. Reed’s interest in ballot measure integrity. Buckley, 424 U.S. 1; Caperton v. A.T. 
Massey Coal Co., 129 S.Ct. 2252 (2009); Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010). 
 87. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916. 
 88. Id. at 914 (quoting McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 197 (2003)). 
 89. Elizabeth Garrett, Voting with Cues, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 1011, 1028 (2003) (“Not only 
ideological groups provide helpful information for voters; knowing which economic interests support 
particular candidates and the strength of their support can also serve as a heuristic.”). 
 90. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916 (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 259 (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
 91. See id. (“With the advent of the Internet, prompt disclosure of expenditures can provide 
shareholders and citizens with the information needed to hold corporations and elected officials 
accountable for their positions and supporters.”). 
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the First Amendment. We must decline to draw, and then redraw, 
constitutional lines based on the particular media or technology used 
to disseminate political speech from a particular speaker.”92 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court stated that federal disclosures could 
be constitutionally applied to both Citizens United’s broadcast ads (a 
push technology where the passive viewer is subject to the ad just by 
turning on the television) as well as its video-on-demand (a pull 
technology where the viewer affirmatively chooses to watch the 
film). This indicates that states have broader latitude than before to 
expand disclosure laws to cover non-broadcast as well as classic 
broadcast political ads. 
The Court also indicated that even commercial speech (in this case, 
touting the purchase of the documentary, Hillary the Movie) can be 
covered by campaign finance disclosure requirements if candidates 
are featured directly before an election. As Justice Kennedy noted, 
“Even if the ads only pertain to a commercial transaction, the public 
has an interest in knowing who is speaking about a candidate shortly 
before an election. [And] the informational interest alone is sufficient 
to justify application of [BCRA’s disclosure requirements] to these 
ads . . . .”93 This greatly expands the scope of ads that can be 
constitutionally subject to disclosure rules. Potentially, under 
Kennedy’s reasoning, even ads from a competitor business that 
criticize a business owned by a candidate could be regulable ads if 
the ads are run directly before an election and mention the candidate. 
Also after Citizens United, the length of a political ad does not 
matter for disclosure purposes. Interestingly, the Supreme Court in 
Citizens United upheld the application of BCRA’s disclosure and 
disclaimers not only to the group’s short ten-second ads, but also to 
its long feature-length film, Hillary the Movie. As Justice Kennedy 
wrote: “We find no constitutional impediment to the application of 
BCRA’s disclaimer and disclosure requirements to a movie broadcast 
via video-on-demand. And there has been no showing that, as applied 
in this case, these requirements would impose a chill on speech or 
                                                                                                                 
 92. Id. at 891. 
 93. Id. at 915–16. 
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expression.”94 Again, this indicates that even if a future political ad 
takes the form of a two-hour infomercial that is broadcast on a cable 
network at two a.m., states still have an interest in regulating it if it 
discusses a candidate’s character and fitness for office directly before 
an election. In the case of Hillary the Movie, the film was scheduled 
to be placed on a video-on-demand cable system within thirty days of 
a presidential primary. 
A few months after Citizens United, the Supreme Court reiterated 
its endorsement of disclosure surrounding elections in Doe v. Reed.95 
The issue in Doe was whether it was appropriate for the State of 
Washington to release the names of petition signatories in a 
referendum battle over gay marriage.96 The case was bifurcated 
between a facial challenge to public disclosure in all referendum 
petitions and an as-applied challenge to disclosure in the particular 
gay marriage petition on the ballot in 2008. Only the facial challenge 
was being reviewed by the Supreme Court while the narrower as-
applied challenged is still being litigated in the lower courts. 
In Doe, the Supreme Court upheld the Washington law allowing 
public disclosure of the names of petition signatories against the 
plaintiff’s facial challenge. The Court said that Washington State’s 
disclosure of these names helped the government maintain the 
integrity of the election process. As Chief Justice Roberts wrote, 
“The State’s interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral 
process is undoubtedly important. States allowing ballot initiatives 
have considerable leeway to protect the integrity and reliability of the 
initiative process, as they have with respect to election processes 
generally.”97 
The Supreme Court was particularly attentive when it came to the 
power of the state to protect its elections from fraud and from the 
resulting cynicism by the electorate that is created by fraud. As the 
Chief Justice noted, “The State’s interest is particularly strong with 
respect to efforts to root out fraud, which not only may produce 
                                                                                                                 
 94. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916. 
 95. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010). 
 96. Id. at 2815. 
 97. Id. at 2819 (quoting Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 191 (1999)). 
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fraudulent outcomes, but has a systemic effect as well: It ‘drives 
honest citizens out of the democratic process and breeds distrust of 
our government.’”98 But, as the Supreme Court also made clear, rank 
fraud was not the only interest implicated by disclosure. In Doe, the 
Court remarked: 
[T]he State’s interest in preserving electoral integrity . . . extends 
to efforts to ferret out invalid signatures caused not by fraud but 
by simple mistake, such as duplicate signatures or signatures of 
individuals who are not registered to vote in the State. 
 . . . . 
. . . Public disclosure can help cure the inadequacies of the 
verification and canvassing process.99 
Disclosure is necessary within the referendum process to ensure 
only legally sufficient ballot measures are placed before the 
electorate for a vote: 
Public disclosure thus helps ensure that the only signatures 
counted are those that should be, and that the only referenda 
placed on the ballot are those that garner enough valid 
signatures. Public disclosure also promotes transparency and 
accountability in the electoral process to an extent other 
measures cannot. In light of the foregoing, we reject plaintiffs’ 
argument and conclude that public disclosure of referendum 
petitions in general is substantially related to the important 
interest of preserving the integrity of the electoral process.100 
                                                                                                                 
 98. Id. (quoting Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006)). 
 99. Id. at 2819–20 (“[Governmental] interest also extends more generally to promoting transparency 
and accountability in the electoral process, which the State argues is essential to the proper functioning 
of a democracy.” (internal quotations omitted)). Also, three Justices in Doe found an anti-corruption 
interest in disclosure in the referendum context as well as the election integrity interest embraced by the 
majority: “Public disclosure of the identity of petition signers . . . advances States’ vital interests in . . . 
‘preventing corruption, and sustaining the active, alert responsibility of the individual citizen in a 
democracy for the wise conduct of government.’” Id. at 2828 (Sotomayor, Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ., 
concurring) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788–89 (1978)). 
 100. Id. at 2820. 
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Thus, between preventing outright fraud and clerical mistakes, the 
Justices found that disclosure of petition signatories bolstered the 
integrity of Washington’s referendum process. Although Doe v. Reed 
is not a campaign finance case, the logic of Citizens United and Doe 
stands for similar principles that elections are special circumstances 
where a right to anonymous speech must generally give way to 
governmental interests in the overall integrity of the democratic 
process of electing candidates on the one hand or putting a 
referendum to a public vote on the other.101 
A.  The Tide Turns in Favor of Disclosure After Citizens United and 
Doe 
Due to a slew of election-year challenges to disclosure laws across 
the country in 2010, lower courts have had an early chance to apply 
the new Citizens United/Doe standards to state laws.102 
Overwhelmingly, lower courts are upholding state disclosure laws, 
subject to the original two caveats: that the laws capture more than 
tiny spenders and that parties can assert an as-applied harassment 
exception to otherwise applicable disclosure laws.103 
                                                                                                                 
 101. See Michael S. Kang, After Citizens United, 44 IND. L. REV. 243, 253 (2010) (“The Court has 
always been more deferential toward campaign finance disclosure requirements than it has been toward 
outright limits on expenditures, contributions, and soft money. . . . The Court’s recent decision in Doe v. 
Reed generally signals that even the Roberts Court remains deferential to government compelled 
campaign disclosure.”). 
 102. A few 2010 cases challenging disclosure on election eve were dismissed out of hand. In New 
York, a federal district court dismissed a challenge to the state’s political committee definition as it 
might apply to an anti-gay marriage group stating that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the 
plaintiff’s unripe claim. “Under these circumstances, there is no reason to believe that plaintiff faces 
sanctions . . . anytime soon, if ever, which means that any substantive analysis that the Court attempted 
now would be only an academic exercise concerning unripe claims.” Nat’l Org. for Marriage, Inc. v. 
Walsh, No. 10-CV-751A, 2010 WL 4174664, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2010) (dismissing complaint for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction). This dismissal has been appealed to the Second Circuit. See Nat’l 
Org. for Marriage, Inc. v. Walsh, No. 10-4572, appeal docketed (2d Cir. Nov. 9, 2010). Similarly, in 
Rhode Island a federal district court dismissed a complaint by the National Organization for Marriage 
for failing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which requires notice pleadings. Nat’l Org. for Marriage, 
Inc. v. Daluz, No. 10-392-ML, slip op. at 1–3 (D.R.I. Sept. 30, 2010) (dismissing complaint for violation 
of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8). This case in Rhode Island was refilled. Plaintiff’s preliminary injunction was 
denied on Oct. 28, 2010. This denial is being appealed in the First Circuit. Nat’l Org. for Marriage, Inc. 
v. Daluz, No. 10-2304, appeal docketed (1st Cir. Nov. 8, 2010). 
 103. See, e.g., Human Life of Wash., Inc. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990, 1013 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(upholding Washington’s political committee financial disclosure requirements and noting, “[i]ndeed, it 
is the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United . . . that provides the best guidance regarding the 
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The D.C. Circuit was one of the first courts to apply the new 
Citizens United disclosure standards to federal independent 
expenditure committees in the SpeechNow case.104 Although the D.C. 
Circuit threw out long-standing contribution limits to independent 
expenditure committees in SpeechNow, the court also upheld federal 
disclosure requirements that apply to such committees. So while 
federal PACs were previously subject to a $5,000 per person 
contribution limit, after SpeechNow they can accept contributions in 
any size if they (1) only spend independently of candidates and (2) 
refrain from giving contributions directly to candidates. SpeechNow, 
in turn, has facilitated the creation of what many in the press dubbed 
“Super PACs”—organizations that can take in and spend unlimited 
amounts, including monies from corporate treasury funds.105 
However, SpeechNow lost its challenge to federal disclosure 
requirements; therefore even Super PACs are subject to the same full 
                                                                                                                 
constitutionality of the Disclosure Law’s requirements”); SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 599 
F.3d 686, 696–97 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (upholding ongoing disclosure requirements for organizations 
making independent expenditures and holding “Citizens United upheld disclaimer and disclosure 
requirements for electioneering communications as applied to Citizens United, again citing the 
government’s interest in providing the electorate with information”); Nat’l Org. for Marriage, Inc. v. 
Roberts, No. 1:10cv192-SPM/GRJ, 2010 WL 4678610, at *5 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 8, 2010) (finding that 
Florida disclosure requirements connected to “electioneering communications organizations” “would 
not prohibit [plaintiff] from engaging in its proposed speech”); Yamada v. Kuramoto, No. 10-00497 
JMS/LEK, 2010 WL 4603936, at *1 (D. Haw. Oct. 29, 2010) (finding that “Citizens United also 
endorsed disclosure”); Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Smithson, No. 4:10-cv-00416, 2010 WL 
4277715, at *3 (S.D. Iowa Oct. 20, 2010) (finding “under Citizens United, ‘[t]he Government may 
regulate corporate political speech through disclaimer and disclosure requirements’” (alteration in 
original)); Wis. Club for Growth, Inc. v. Myse, No. 10-cv-427-wmc, 2010 WL 4024932, at *5 (W.D. 
Wis. Oct. 13, 2010) (“[P]laintiffs’ reliance on FEC v. WRTL ignores the Supreme Court’s later treatment 
of disclosure and disclaimer regulations in Citizens United.”); Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. 
Swanson, 741 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1128 (D. Minn. 2010) (“The law to which Plaintiffs object is, in fact, a 
disclosure law—a method of requiring corporations desiring to make independent expenditures to 
disclose their activities. Such laws are permissible under Citizens United.”), aff’d --- F.3d ----, 2011 WL 
1833236 (8th Cir. May 16, 2011); Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 735 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1000 
(N.D. Ill. 2010) (“[I]n Citizens United, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the contention that 
election-law disclosure requirements are limited to express advocacy or its functional equivalent.”); 
Nat’l Org. for Marriage, Inc. v. McKee, 723 F. Supp. 2d 245, 264 (D. Me. 2010) (upholding Maine’s 
political committee financial disclosure requirements and finding “NOM’s desire to limit campaign 
finance disclosures to ‘major purpose’ groups would yield perverse results, totally at odds with the 
interest in ‘transparency’ recognized in Citizens United”). 
 104. SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 105. See Dan Eggen & T.W. Farnam, New “Super PACs” Bringing Millions into Campaigns, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 28, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/ 
27/AR2010092706500.html. 
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disclosure as any other federal PAC. For example, because of this 
transparency, the public knows that in the 2010 midterm election, the 
largest Super PAC, American Crossroads, raised over $26 million 
from 411 sources, in some cases with donations as big as $2 million, 
including those from corporate donors.106 
Even though independent expenditure committees were at issue in 
SpeechNow, the D.C. Circuit held there were still strong 
governmental interests in requiring disclosure of who had made 
contributions to the political committee. As the D.C. Circuit wrote: 
[T]he public has an interest in knowing who is speaking about a 
candidate and who is funding that speech, no matter whether the 
contributions were made towards administrative expenses or 
independent expenditures. Further, requiring disclosure of such 
information deters and helps expose violations of other campaign 
finance restrictions, such as those barring contributions from 
foreign corporations or individuals. These are sufficiently 
important governmental interests to justify requiring SpeechNow 
to organize and report to the FEC as a political committee.107 
The plaintiffs in SpeechNow appealed their loss on the issue of 
whether federal disclosure laws could be constitutionally applied to 
them.108 The Supreme Court denied SpeechNow’s petition for 
certiorari, thereby leaving the D.C. Circuit’s endorsement of 
disclosure for federal independent expenditure committees intact.109 
B.  Post-Citizens United Governmental Interests in Disclosure 
Lower federal courts reviewing state campaign disclosure laws in 
2010 have come to similar conclusions as the Supreme Court and the 
D.C. Circuit that there are strong governmental interests supporting 
                                                                                                                 
 106. American Crossroads, Center for Responsive Politics, http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/ 
lookup2.php?cycle=2010&strID=C00487363 (last visited Mar. 22, 2011). 
 107. SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686, 698 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Keating v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 131 S. Ct. 553 (2010). 
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disclosure in the campaign finance and other election-related 
contexts. 
For example, the Ninth Circuit in Human Life of Washington Inc. 
v. Brumsickle (the appeal of the 2008 Brumsickle case discussed at 
length above) found that the government has a strong interest in 
providing basic information to voters: 
Providing information to the electorate is vital to the efficient 
functioning of the marketplace of ideas, and thus to advancing 
the democratic objectives underlying the First Amendment. . . . 
“In a republic where the people are sovereign, the ability of the 
citizenry to make informed choices among candidates for office 
is essential.” Thus, by revealing information about the 
contributors to and participants in public discourse and debate, 
disclosure laws help ensure that voters have the facts they need 
to evaluate the various messages competing for their attention.110 
The Ninth Circuit also noted that voters’ informational interest is 
only likely to increase as the number of political speakers multiplies: 
“Access to reliable information becomes even more important as 
more speakers, more speech—and thus more spending—enter the 
marketplace, which is precisely what has occurred in recent years.”111 
Indeed, the appellate court noted that Washington’s disclosure law 
was meant to protect the electorate from secretive special interests. 
As the court noted, “Thus, to prevent the public from being misled by 
special interest groups ‘masquerading as proponents of the public 
weal,’ the voters who passed Washington’s Disclosure Law ‘merely 
provided for a modicum of information from those’ who wish to 
influence the public’s vote.”112 Also, the Ninth Circuit relied on Doe 
                                                                                                                 
 110. Human Life of Wash., Inc. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990, 1005 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). 
 111. Id. at 1007. 
 112. Id. at 1017 (quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954)). 
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in addition to Citizens United when selecting the appropriate level of 
scrutiny for disclosure.113 
Post-Citizens United, federal district courts have likewise come to 
similar conclusions that disclosure aids the electorate in making 
sound democratic choices. The Federal Court for the Northern 
District of Florida—the very same court that had been so hostile to 
ballot measure disclosure in Browning in 2009 held in 2010 that 
“[t]he government has a sufficiently important interest to ‘increase 
the fund of information concerning those who support [a] 
candidate . . . [and] shed the light of publicity on spending.’”114 The 
plaintiff, the National Organization for Marriage (NOM), had argued 
that strict scrutiny should apply to the disclosure law. The federal 
district court in Florida noted that: “NOM has failed to demonstrate a 
substantial likelihood of success. . . . Neither the ‘major purpose’ 
requirement nor strict scrutiny is applicable. The Florida statutes at 
issue pass exacting scrutiny because there is a substantial relation 
between the disclosure requirements and a sufficiently important 
governmental interest.”115 Consequently this court in Florida in 2010 
refused to enjoin that state’s electioneering communications 
disclosure law. 
In Iowa, plaintiff Iowa Right To Life (IRTL) challenged (among 
other aspects of the law) the 48-hour filing period for certain 
campaign finance reporting. The Federal District Court for the 
Southern District of Iowa found this timeframe unobjectionable after 
Citizens United: “The Court . . . finds . . . [r]equiring prompt 
disclosures, especially close to an election, helps to assure that they 
are made ‘in time to provide relevant information to voters.’ And, 
contrary to IRTL’s assertions, the Court does not find the 48-hour 
reporting requirement to be an ‘onerous’ burden.”116 In addition, the 
                                                                                                                 
 113. Id. at 1005 (“As the latest in a trilogy of recent Supreme Court cases, [Doe v.] Reed confirmed 
that exacting scrutiny applies in the campaign finance disclosure context. See Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. 
at 914; Davis, 128 S.Ct. at 2765-66.”). 
 114. Nat’l Org. for Marriage, Inc. v. Roberts, No. 1:10cv192-SPM/GRJ, 2010 WL 4678610, at *5 
(N.D. Fla. Nov. 8, 2010) (first alteration added). 
 115. Id. (denying preliminary injunction of electioneering communications law). 
 116. Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Smithson, No. 4:10-cv-00416, 2010 WL 4277715, at * 16 
(Oct. 20, 2010 S.D. Iowa) (citations omitted). But cf. Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 723 F. Supp. 2d 
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Iowa court cited Doe when applying intermediate scrutiny to 
disclosure.117 
A challenge to Hawaii’s disclosure statute was similarly 
unsuccessful. The Federal District Court for the District of Hawaii 
noted that after Citizens United “[i]n essence, corporations are free to 
speak, but should do so openly.”118 The court concluded that a 
plaintiff corporation should be subject to disclosure laws because 
“[i]t actively participates in our democracy; it is not unconstitutional 
to require it to comply with campaign spending laws that are 
substantially related to important government interests.”119 The 
Hawaii case also relied in part on Doe when applying intermediate 
scrutiny to disclosure.120 
C.  Issue Advocacy Is Back in the Mix 
The Ninth Circuit in one of the earlier circuit court decisions after 
Citizens United noted that disclosure may be constitutionally applied 
to some issue advocacy. In a case about the disclosure that could be 
required around the funding of ballot initiative fights, the appellate 
court noted: “[T]he [Supreme] Court affirmed and reiterated the 
importance of disclosure requirements—even requirements that apply 
to issue advocacy—to the government’s interest in informing the 
electorate.” The Ninth Circuit continued, “Like the requirements in 
Citizens United, Washington State’s political committee disclosure 
requirements . . . are narrowly tailored such that the required 
disclosure increases as a political committee more actively engages in 
campaign spending and as an election nears.”121 
                                                                                                                 
245, 267 (D. Me. 2010) (“[Maine’s] regulation requiring twenty-four-hour disclosure of any 
independent expenditure over $250 at any time is unconstitutionally burdensome.”). 
 117. Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc., 2010 WL 4277715 at *13. 
 118. Yamada v. Kuramoto, No. 10-00497 JMS/LEK, 2010 WL 4603936, at *1 (D. Haw. Oct. 29, 
2010); see also id. at *20 ( “[T]he disclaimer provision for an electioneering-communication 
advertisement all withstand constitutional challenge. These Hawaii provisions promote disclosure—a 
value endorsed, embraced and extended in Citizens United.”). 
 119. Id. at *16. 
 120. Id. at *11. 
 121. Human Life of Wash., Inc. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990, 1013 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). 
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Although ballot initiatives are different from candidate elections, 
the Ninth Circuit found there was still the voters’ informational 
interest in knowing who was behind a ballot campaign, arguing:  
In the ballot initiative context . . . where express and issue 
advocacy are arguably ‘one and the same,’ any incidental 
regulation of issue advocacy imposes more limited burdens that 
are more likely to be substantially related to the government’s 
interests. Because regulation of issue advocacy in the ballot 
context is virtually indistinguishable from regulation of express 
advocacy (an admittedly appropriate enterprise), such regulation 
is more closely related to the government’s interest in informing 
the electorate.122 
The Ninth Circuit went on to state that issue advocacy could be 
constitutionally subject to disclosure after Citizens United. The court 
wrote: “[E]ven if [the plaintiff’s] proposed communications 
constitute unadulterated issue advocacy, its argument has been 
foreclosed by the Supreme Court[] . . . . [And] [g]iven . . . Citizens 
United, . . . the position that disclosure requirements cannot 
constitutionally reach issue advocacy is unsupportable.”123 
A federal district court in Maine agreed with the Ninth Circuit 
approach that issue advocacy may be properly subjected to disclosure 
after Citizens United because it “rejected the idea that ‘disclosure 
requirements must be limited to speech that is the functional 
equivalent of express advocacy.’ . . . [E]ven if ads ‘only pertain to a 
commercial transaction’ and do not engage directly in political 
speech, government can require disclosure of ‘who is speaking about 
a candidate.’”124 The Maine District Court found that Citizens United 
provided more leeway for state governments to impose strong 
disclosure laws. The district court explained: 
                                                                                                                 
 122. Id. at 1018. 
 123. Id. at 1016. 
 124. McKee, 723 F. Supp. 2d at 262 (footnote call number omitted). 
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Citizens United went further than McConnell. It did not limit the 
government’s informational interest to disclosures of 
“electioneering activity” . . . Rather, it recognized the general 
“public . . . interest in knowing who is speaking about a 
candidate shortly before an election”—even if the speech is only 
a commercial for a film about a candidate.125 
As discussed above, Citizens United was quite expansive in its 
handling of federal disclosure law, and lower courts are applying this 
expansive understanding to state laws. As the district judge in Maine 
explained, “In Citizens United, this ‘informational interest alone’ was 
‘sufficient’ to justify a disclosure requirement. Maine’s statute 
treating statements about a clearly identified candidate in the limited 
period before an election is similarly justified . . . .”126 
The Maine court also stated that challenges to Maine’s disclaimer 
laws were foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s holdings in Citizens 
United upholding federal disclaimer requirements: “Citizens United 
has effectively disposed of any attack on Maine’s attribution and 
disclaimer requirements. . . . According to the Supreme Court, . . . 
[t]hey are justified by the governmental interest in providing 
information to the electorate and permitting the electorate to make 
informed choices.”127 Thus, on-ad disclaimers, like more detailed 
reporting that campaigners make directly to the state, also enjoy 
Citizens United’s protection. 
Like other lower courts, the district court in Maine recognized that 
the WRTL II functional equivalency test was summarily rejected in 
Citizens United128 and that disclaimers on issue advocacy were back 
in play: 
                                                                                                                 
 125. Id. at 265–66. 
 126. Id. at 266 (footnote call number omitted). 
 127. Id. at 267. 
 128. Id. (“Indeed, Citizens United refused to import the ‘express advocacy and its functional 
equivalent’ test into disclosure and disclaimer rules.”). 
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Whether they deal with express advocacy or not, “the public has 
an interest in knowing who is speaking about a candidate shortly 
before an election.” 
 The requirement that these communications include disclosure 
of whether the candidate authorized the message and the identity 
of the person or group that made or financed the message is tied 
directly to the state’s informational interest and provides voters 
with immediate insight into whose interests a candidate may 
serve. The impositions are minimal, given the important interests 
involved.129 
Maine’s district court is part of the growing trend of extending 
Citizens United-style disclosure to issue ads and finding them 
constitutional. 
In Hawaii, a federal district court also acknowledged that issue 
advocacy could be constitutionally subject to disclosure requirements 
after Citizens United and the Ninth Circuit’s Brumsickle. This court 
found, “Stated another way, that some issue advocacy may fall within 
a disclosure requirement is not necessarily fatal to the regulation 
itself. [The] Government may impose reasonable disclosure 
requirements . . . .”130 
A federal district court in Illinois came to a similar conclusion 
when reviewing Illinois’ new disclosure law, which was passed in the 
wake of the Governor Rod Blagojevich campaign finance scandal 
and impeachment. The court explained: 
Citizens United . . . expressly rejected the contention that 
election-law disclosure requirements are limited to express 
advocacy or its functional equivalent. Even as to an 
advertisement that “only pertains to a commercial transaction” 
and did not engage directly in political speech . . . the express 
advocacy rule does not apply to registration requirements, 
                                                                                                                 
 129. Id. (footnote call numbers omitted). 
 130. Yamada v. Kuramoto, No. 10-00497 JMS/LEK, 2010 WL 4603936, at *10 (D. Haw. Oct. 7, 
2010); id. at *18 (“Essentially, disclosure requirements can apply to issue advocacy, so long as the 
exacting scrutiny test is otherwise met.”). 
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including related reporting, recordkeeping, and disclosure 
requirements.131 
Like many other federal district courts facing election-eve challenges, 
the court in Illinois rejected the plaintiff’s request for a preliminary 
injunction in Center for Individual Freedom v. Madigan.132 
The tide may have even turned in favor of disclosure in South 
Carolina, which is in the Fourth Circuit and therefore has the most 
hostile circuit precedent to contend with. In a 2010 challenge to 
South Carolina’s PAC definitions, as well as to disclosure of South 
Carolina’s version of electioneering communications, the court struck 
the PAC definition as being overbroad under NCRL III but declined 
to strike the remaining disclosure requirements under Citizens 
United.133 The district court wrote approvingly of the disclosure law 
even though the South Carolina definition covered forty-five days 
instead of thirty days before a primary as well as non-broadcast ads. 
The district court in South Carolina concluded: 
South Carolina’s definition of “influence the outcome of an 
elective office” does reach communication channels, including 
direct mail and e-mail, that the federal government has 
previously chosen not to regulate. However, the Supreme Court’s 
recent ruling in Citizens United indicates that South Carolina 
may be constitutionally permitted to require some level of 
disclosure on organizations based on the dissemination of a 
communication that “promotes or supports a candidate or attacks 
                                                                                                                 
 131. Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 735 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1000 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (citation 
omitted). 
 132. Many of these election-eve suits from 2010 were started as requests for preliminary injunctions. 
This may have been a strategy that backfired. The plaintiffs may have thought judges might have been 
more willing to enjoin laws that they characterized as burdensome directly before an actual election. 
However, most judges took the opposite approach, stating it would be disruptive to the state and the 
election to change the rules of the game so close to election day.  
 133. Because most disclosure in South Carolina was effectuated through the PAC reporting 
requirements, striking this part of the law has rendered the rest of the South Carolina disclosure law 
largely a nullity until the legislature chooses to adjust the statute. 
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or opposes a candidate, regardless of whether the communication 
expressly advocates a vote for or against a candidate . . . .”134 
This indicates that lower courts are keeping an open mind when 
considering the constitutionality of disclosure after Citizens United, 
even in South Carolina where the disclosure law encompasses more 
non-magic-word political advertisements than BCRA. 
III.  THE OLD EXCEPTIONS TO DISCLOSURE STILL APPLY 
A.  The De Minimis Exception to Disclosure 
Courts have long held that disclosure should be excused where it 
only captures de minimis spending in elections.135 This de minimis 
exception still applies after Citizens United, which involved a multi-
million dollar film production. Most recently, the Tenth Circuit was 
quite unsympathetic to a disclosure law in Colorado that reached the 
actions of a few neighbors seeking to fight a local annexation. As the 
court noted, “It is unlikely that the Colorado voters who approved the 
disclosure requirements . . . were thinking of the [plaintiff 
neighbors].”136 The Tenth Circuit held Colorado’s disclosure law was 
unconstitutional as applied to a group of six neighbors who raised 
less than $2,000 in cash in a ballot measure fight.137 The court said 
that when balancing the public’s right to know against the plaintiffs’ 
associational rights, there was not a sufficient state interest to justify 
the burden on association: 
                                                                                                                 
 134. S.C. Citizens For Life, Inc. v. Krawcheck, No. 4:06-cv-2773-TLW, 2010 WL 3582377, at *18 
(D.S.C. Sept. 13, 2010). 
 135. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (invalidating disclosure for handmade 
leaflets in a ballot measure campaign); Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 1993) 
(striking down a Rhode Island law that required PACs to disclose the identity of every contributor, even 
when the contribution was as small as $1, a practice known as “first dollar disclosure”). For a discussion 
of McIntyr, see Robert F. Bauer, Not Just a Private Matter: the Purposes of Disclosure in an Expanded 
Regulatory System, 6 ELECTION L.J. 38 (2007). 
 136. Sampson v. Buescher, 625 F.3d 1247, 1254 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 137. Id. 
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[T]he burden on Plaintiffs’ right to association imposed by 
Colorado’s registration and reporting requirements cannot be 
justified by a public interest in disclosure. The burdens are 
substantial. The average citizen cannot be expected to master on 
his or her own the many campaign financial-disclosure 
requirements set forth in Colorado’s constitution, the Campaign 
Act, and the Secretary of State’s Rules Concerning Campaign 
and Political Finance. . . . As the Supreme Court recently 
observed . . . : “Prolix laws chill speech for the same reason that 
vague laws chill speech: People of common intelligence must 
necessarily guess at the law’s meaning and differ as to its 
application.”138 
One aspect of the case that the Tenth Circuit found weighed heavily 
against upholding disclosure was that the dollar amounts involved 
were so small and most of which were spent on attorneys’ fees to 
comply with the law.139 As the Tenth Circuit noted, “The 
expenditures in this case . . . are sufficiently small that they say little 
about the contributors’ views of their financial interest in the 
annexation issue.”140 Therefore the court concluded, “[T]he financial 
burden of state regulation on Plaintiffs’ freedom of association 
approaches or exceeds the value of their financial contributions to 
their political effort; and the governmental interest in imposing those 
regulations is minimal, if not non-existent, in light of the small size of 
the contributions.”141 
However, the court of appeals in Sampson took pains to note they 
were not excusing big spenders on ballot measures from disclosures. 
Instead, the court articulated a narrow exception to de minimis 
spending: 
                                                                                                                 
 138. Id. at 1259–60. 
 139. Id. at 1260 n.5 (cash contributions for the committee were $1,426 and $1,178 were spent for 
attorneys’ fees). 
 140. Id. at 1261. 
 141. Id. 
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We do not attempt to draw a bright line below which a ballot-
issue committee cannot be required to report contributions and 
expenditures. The case before us is quite unlike ones involving 
the expenditure of tens of millions of dollars . . . . We say only 
that Plaintiffs’ contributions and expenditures are well below the 
line.142 
In other words, the state clearly still has the ability to regulate 
persons or entities that make large expenditures on ballot measures. 
The Tenth Circuit’s approach in Sampson followed the reasoning of a 
pre-Citizens United case from the Ninth Circuit that concluded the 
lower the amount of money spent in a political battle, the more 
diminished the state’s interest in disclosure is.143 
B.  The Harassment Exception to Disclosure 
Buckley made clear that members of despised minority parties 
could request exemptions from otherwise applicable campaign 
finance disclosure laws on the theory that the exposure of their 
contributing members might endanger them. So far, the only 
Supreme Court case to actually grant such a harassment exemption 
was to the Socialist Workers Party in 1982.144 
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court held open the door for 
future challenges based on actual, demonstrable harassment, but it 
did not find a risk of harassment plausible in Citizens United’s 
particular case. Citizens United had argued to the Court that 
disclosure requirements would chill donations to their organization 
“by exposing donors to retaliation.”145 The Supreme Court 
acknowledged that there was a harassment exception to disclosure: 
                                                                                                                 
 142. Sampson, 625 F.3d at 1261. 
 143. See Canyon Ferry Rd. Baptist Church v. Unsworth, 556 F.3d 1021, 1033 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding 
disclosure statute unconstitutional as applied to a one-time in-kind de minimis expenditure in a ballot 
measure context and stating “the value of this financial information to the voters declines drastically as 
the value of the expenditure or contribution sinks to a negligible level”). 
 144. Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87, 88 (1982); see also 35 
Op. Fed. Election Comm’n 5 (2009-01), http://www.fec.gov/pdf/record/2009/may09.pdf (granting the 
Social Workers Party and its affiliates an exemption from federal reporting requirements through 2012). 
 145. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010). 
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“[We] recognized that § 201 would be unconstitutional as applied to 
an organization if there were a reasonable probability that the group’s 
members would face threats, harassment, or reprisals if their names 
were disclosed.”146 While the harassment exception remained intact, 
however, the Supreme Court found the harassment exception 
inapplicable to Citizens United as a group. As the Court explained, 
there had been no credible showing of harassment: “Citizens United, 
however, has offered no evidence that its members may face similar 
threats or reprisals. To the contrary, Citizens United has been 
disclosing its donors for years and has identified no instance of 
harassment or retaliation.”147 
Doe v. Reed also clearly reaffirms that a harassment exception on 
disclosure is also available in the electoral context of disclosing ballot 
petition signatories. The Doe plaintiffs asserted that they would face 
harassment if the state of Washington released the names of who 
signed the petition to get Referendum 71 on the ballot. As the 
Supreme Court framed the case: 
Plaintiffs explain that once on the Internet, the petition signers’ 
names and addresses “can be combined with publicly available 
phone numbers and maps,” in what will effectively become a 
blueprint for harassment and intimidation. . . .  
 . . . [W]e have explained that those resisting disclosure can 
prevail under the First Amendment if they can show “a 
reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure [of personal 
information] will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals 
from either Government officials or private parties.”148 
Plaintiffs in Doe asserted that harassment was more likely given the 
ability to aggregate information using modern technology. Justice 
                                                                                                                 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2820 (2010) (last alteration in original). 
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Alito in his concurrence and Justice Thomas in his dissent were 
alarmed by this risk of harassment to petition signers.149 
However, the Justices in Doe were deeply split as to what quantum 
of proof a group or individual would have to show to take advantage 
of the harassment exception to disclosure. In particular, most of the 
examples of potential harassment proffered by plaintiffs and their 
amici did not come from Washington at all, but rather from 
California. In Justice Alito’s concurrence, he argued that a low level 
of proof should be required to assert a harassment exception to 
disclosure to avoid a chilling effect: 
[S]peakers must be able to obtain an as-applied exemption 
without clearing a high evidentiary hurdle. . . . [S]peakers could 
rely on a wide array of evidence to meet that standard, including 
“specific evidence of past or present harassment of [group] 
members,” “harassment directed against the organization itself,” 
or a “pattern of threats or specific manifestations of public 
hostility.” . . . [And] “[n]ew [groups] that have no history upon 
which to draw may be able to offer evidence of reprisals and 
threats directed against individuals or organizations holding 
similar views.”150 
But other Justices did not agree with Justice Alito’s lax approach to 
the harassment exception. Justice Scalia, by contrast, argued that 
there is no right to anonymous speech enshrined in the 
Constitution.151 Meanwhile, Justices Sotomayor, Stevens and 
Ginsburg argued that a high standard of proof would be appropriate 
for those asserting harassment exceptions to disclosure in electoral 
                                                                                                                 
 149. Id. at 2823 (Alito, J. concurring) (“The widespread harassment and intimidation suffered by 
supporters of California’s Proposition 8 provides strong support for an as-applied exemption in the 
present case.”); id. at 2845 (Thomas, J. dissenting) (“the state of technology today creates at least some 
probability that signers of every referendum will be subjected to threats, harassment, or reprisals if their 
personal information is disclosed.”). 
 150. Id. at 2823 (Alito, J., concurring) (third, fifth, and sixth alteration in original).  
 151. Id. at 2837 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“For my part, I do not look forward to a society which, 
thanks to the Supreme Court, campaigns anonymously (McIntyre) and even exercises the direct 
democracy of initiative and referendum hidden from public scrutiny and protected from the 
accountability of criticism. This does not resemble the Home of the Brave.”). 
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contexts. These three stated, “[A]ny party attempting to challenge 
particular applications of the State’s regulations will bear a heavy 
burden. . . . Case-specific relief may be available . . . in the rare 
circumstance in which disclosure poses a reasonable probability of 
serious and widespread harassment that the State is unwilling or 
unable to control.”152 These Justices were concerned that too lax a 
standard for the harassment exception might tie state regulators’ 
hands in knots. 
Allowing case-specific invalidation under a more forgiving 
standard would unduly diminish the substantial breathing room 
States are afforded to adopt and implement reasonable, 
nondiscriminatory . . . disclosure requirement[s] . . . . [C]ourts 
. . . should be deeply skeptical of any assertion that the 
Constitution, which embraces political transparency, compels 
States to conceal the identity of persons who seek to participate 
in lawmaking through a state-created referendum process.153 
Justice Stevens was particularly pointed in his concurrence that a 
high level of proof should be required before a state’s disclosure law 
was not applied to a given circumstance: “I would demand strong 
evidence before concluding that an indirect and speculative chain of 
events imposes a substantial burden on speech. A statute ‘is not to be 
upset upon hypothetical and unreal possibilities, if it would be good 
upon the facts as they are.’”154 Justice Breyer joined Justice Stevens 
in this opinion.155 
Justice Thomas in his dissent laments the fact that the Court cannot 
articulate a clear standard for evidence to satisfy the harassment 
exception to disclosure. He questioned: 
                                                                                                                 
 152. Id. at 2829 (Sotomayor, Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ., concurring). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 2831–32 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Pullman Co. v. Knott, 235 U.S. 23, 26 (1914)) 
(footnote call number omitted). 
 155. Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2829. 
43
Torres-Spelliscy: Has the Tide Turned in Favor of Disclosure? Revealing Money in Po
Published by Reading Room, 2011
 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:4 
 
1100 
What sort of evidence suffices to satisfy this apparently more 
relaxed, though perhaps more elusive, [reasonable probability] 
standard? Does one instance of actual harassment directed 
toward one signer mean that the “reasonable probability” 
requirement is met? . . . The Court does not answer any of these 
questions, leaving a vacuum to be filled on a case-by-case 
basis.156 
But the Court could not come to a consensus on how a group would 
prove that they were subject to a risk of harassment going forward—
thereby giving little guidance to the lower courts that will have to 
resolve this issue in future cases. The Court may have another 
opportunity to decide this issue if Doe’s related as-applied challenge 
comes before the Court. 
Like the Supreme Court, which held the harassment exception to 
disclosure did not apply to Citizens United, the Ninth Circuit, 
reviewing a challenge to Washington’s disclosure laws, held that the 
plaintiffs had not demonstrated any evidence of harassment to 
warrant as applied relief from disclosure to referendum campaign 
finance disclosure laws. The Ninth Circuit held, “[The plaintiff] 
Human Life does not provide any evidence to support an as-applied 
challenge . . . . It does not, for example, explain how the Disclosure 
Law impinges upon its associational freedoms.”157 
Pre-Citizens United cases from the lower courts have largely not 
granted harassment exceptions to campaign finance disclosure. For 
example, a case in Maine from 2009 about a gay marriage ballot 
initiative fight noted that plaintiffs had no evidence of harassment in 
Maine: 
[T]he plaintiffs have not made a colorable claim that their First 
Amendment rights of free association are threatened by 
harassment that might follow disclosure. . . . [N]or is there a 
record here indicating a pattern of threats or specific 
                                                                                                                 
 156. Id. at 2845 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 157. Human Life of Wash., Inc. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990, 1021–22 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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manifestations of public hostility towards them or showing that 
individuals or organizations holding similar views have been 
threatened or harmed.158 
In a much more contentious case out of California’s ballot initiative 
battle over gay marriage, which did have evidence of isolated 
harassment of supporters of California’s Proposition 8 (Prop. 8), 
which defined marriage as being between one man and one woman, 
the district court still found that a group supporting heterosexual 
marriage was not “vulnerable to the same threats as were socialist 
and communist groups, or, for that matter, the NAACP. Proposition 8 
supporters[’] . . . belief in the traditional . . . marriage . . . have not 
historically invited animosity.”159 In the Prop. 8 case, the Federal 
Court for the Eastern District of California found that the harassment 
exemption was meant for minorities, not powerful majorities: “[T]he 
Supreme Court created an exception not for the majority, but for 
those groups in which the government has a diminished interest.”160 
Furthermore, even though certain Prop. 8 supporters had been 
subject to harassment, including physical intimidation, the district 
court was unpersuaded that an injunction of the California disclosure 
law should be issued because the harassment that had been alleged 
was properly a matter for the criminal authorities.161 
[T]he Court strongly condemns the behavior of those who resort 
to violence, and/or other illegal behavior . . . . 
Those responsible for threatening the lives of supporters of 
Proposition 8 are subject to criminal liability. . . . Those mailing 
white powder to organizations are subject to federal prosecution. 
. . . [T]here are appropriate legal channels through which to 
                                                                                                                 
 158. Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 666 F. Supp. 2d 193, 206 n.74, 212–13 (D. Me. 2009) 
(upholding reporting requirements for ballot questions affecting nonprofit corporations that are not 
PACs). 
 159. ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1217 (E.D. Cal. 2009). 
 160. Id. at 1216. 
 161. This case was on going on the merits in the district court at the time this article went to press. 
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rectify and deter the reoccurrence of such reprehensible 
behavior.162 
Rather, the court found that the plaintiffs in ProtectMarriage were 
trying to shield themselves from any response to their actions 
including perfectly legal and peaceful boycotts: 
Plaintiffs’ exemption argument appears to be premised . . . on the 
concept that individuals should be free from even legal 
consequences of their speech. That is simply not the nature of 
their right. Just as contributors to Proposition 8 are free to speak 
in favor of the initiative, so are opponents free to express their 
disagreement through proper legal means.163 
The court refused to grant a preliminary injunction of California’s 
disclosure law even in the face of demonstrable harassment against 
certain supporters of Prop. 8. Litigation over the harassment 
exception is likely to rage on for years. It is possible that the 
exception may remain a narrow one for despised minority parties like 
the Socialist Workers Party. Or it is possible that the exception could 
be expanded to anyone showing a reasonable probability of 
harassment including victorious majorities.164 
IV.  POLICY TAKE-AWAYS FOR STATE DISCLOSURE LAWS 
Of course, disclosure laws are not the only policy response to 
increased political spending.165 But disclosure is the primary means 
                                                                                                                 
 162. ProtectMarriage.com, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 1217–18. 
 163. Id. at 1217. 
 164. For a more in depth discussion of the harassment exception see Mike Wakefield, Compelled 
Disclosure in the Wake of California's Proposition 8: Exploring the Applicability of Buckley’s Minor 
Party Exemption to the Majority, 25 J.L. & POL. 375, 377 (2009) (“Ultimately, this paper concludes that 
Protectmarriage.com and similar groups will struggle to show that the alleged constitutional harm 
suffered by their contributors outweighs the government’s interest in compelled disclosure.”). 
 165. For an alternative policy suggestion see John L. McCormack, Justice and Truth in Political 
Discourse, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 519, 533 (2005) (“[T]he author suggests that it may be appropriate to 
consider whether advertising and public relations specialists should be regulated when they are 
employed to promote political candidates or views. Lawyers are restricted by codes of professional 
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left for regulating independent spending within the campaign finance 
context.166 For states that already have robust disclosure laws on the 
books, Citizens United and Doe v. Reed provide state attorneys 
general with new tools to help defend these laws from facial as well 
as most as-applied challenges. Lower courts are already applying 
these new standards to uphold a gamut of state disclosure laws 
ranging from ballot measures to candidate elections, and from 
express advocacy to issue advocacy. 
For states that wish to freshen up their disclosure laws to make 
sure that the laws are capturing the way modern campaigns are 
waged, Citizens United and Doe v. Reed provides considerable 
leeway for lawmakers to require more disclosure of more types of 
political advertisements than ever. In other words, the Supreme Court 
just expanded the constitutional bounds for requiring disclosure of 
the funding of election-related speech, and states should use this 
license to expand their disclosure laws accordingly. 
State legislatures still need to do their proverbial homework when 
adopting a new campaign finance disclosure law, by holding 
committee hearings and gathering evidence in the official legislative 
record of why older disclosure laws have been evaded by bigger 
spenders or why new categories of coverage are necessary for local 
conditions. In particular, the pre-Citizens United reasoning may be 
revived in a hostile circuit, and in order to successfully defend a new 
disclosure law, states will need to have a particularly strong 
legislative record as to why they are covering non-broadcast ECs. 
Law makers should do their best to augment the legislative record 
with empirical evidence instead of relying on anecdotal evidence. 
To deal with the harassment exemption to disclosure, states could 
adopt a similar tactic to the FEC, which issues advisory opinions that 
exempt entities alleging a demonstrable risk of harassment. The state 
                                                                                                                 
ethics from lying to courts and third parties in the course of representing clients. A good start to fixing 
the problem would be considering somewhat similar restrictions on mass persuasion professionals when 
they are hired to work in political arenas.”). 
 166. For more detailed policy suggestions see Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Transparent Elections After 
Citizens United (Brennan Center 2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1776482. 
47
Torres-Spelliscy: Has the Tide Turned in Favor of Disclosure? Revealing Money in Po
Published by Reading Room, 2011
 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:4 
 
1104 
regulator who administers the state’s campaign finance laws could 
likewise grant requested exemptions from disclosure. 
Finally, state lawmakers should remember that they are trying to 
capture the “bigger fish” and larger spenders with their campaign 
finance disclosure laws. Therefore, they should set disclosure 
thresholds at reasonable levels. A reporting threshold set close to one 
dollar is likely to be struck down by a court worried that the de 
minimis actions of a few citizens may be captured and chilled.167 
Furthermore, given the nearly non-stop litigation over campaign 
finance laws, any new legislation should be sure to contain a 
severability clause so that hostile courts cannot destroy an entire 
campaign finance regime just because one small part offends their 
sensibilities. Furthermore, states have the greatest constitutional 
protection when they regulate non-magic word political 
advertisements if those ads air close to an election. 
The tide has turned in favor of campaign finance disclosure and 
WRTL II’s brief reign of destruction of reporting requirements is 
over. The new jurisprudence provides states with an increased ability 
to change their laws post-Citizens United, especially in the twenty-
four states—which thanks to the decision—now have corporations 
and unions spending in elections for the first time in decades.168 
                                                                                                                 
 167. Id. at 13 (“Disclosure laws should not trap the unwary or entangle tiny groups of people spending 
relatively small amounts of money.”). 
 168. As one author laments, “The fact that wealthy entities are already versed in the use of 
manipulative messaging highlights our need to increase governmental efforts to counteract this harmful 
influence. Unfortunately, the Citizens United decision does more than to give corporate interests a place 
at the table. It gives them a place at the head of the table and a bullhorn.” Molly J. Walker Wilson, Too 
Much of a Good Thing: Campaign Speech after Citizens United, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2365, 2392 (June 
2010). 
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